Fully device independent Conference Key Agreement by Ribeiro, Jérémy et al.
Fully device independent Conference Key Agreement
Jérémy Ribeiro and Gláucia Murta
QuTech, Delft University of Technology, Lorentzweg 1, 2628 CJ Delft, The Netherlands
Stephanie Wehner
QuTech, Delft Uniaversity of Technology, Lorentzweg 1, 2628 CJ Delft, The Netherlands
We present the first security analysis of conference key agreement (CKA) in the most adversarial
model of device independence (DI). Our protocol can be implemented by any experimental setup
that is capable of performing Bell tests (specifically, we introduce the “Parity-CHSH” inequality),
and security can in principle be obtained for any violation of the Parity-CHSH inequality. We use a
direct connection between the N -partite Parity-CHSH inequality and the CHSH inequality. Namely
the Parity-CHSH inequality can be considered as a CHSH inequality or another CHSH inequality
(equivalent up to relabelling) depending on the parity of the output of N − 2 of the parties. We
compare the asymptotic key rate for DICKA to the case where the parties use N − 1 DIQKD
protocols in order to generate a common key. We show that for some regime of noise the DICKA
protocol leads to better rates.
Quantum communication allows cryptographic secu-
rity that is provably impossible to obtain using any classi-
cal means. Probably the most famous example of a quan-
tum advantage is quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2],
which allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange an
encryption key whose security is guaranteed even if the
adversary has an arbitrarily powerful quantum computer.
What’s more, properties of entanglement lead to the re-
markable feature that security is sometimes possible even
if the quantum devices used to execute the protocol are
largely untrusted. Specifically, the notion of device in-
dependent (DI) security [3–5] models quantum devices
as black boxes in which we may only choose measure-
ment settings and observe measurement outcomes. Yet,
the quantum state and measurements employed by such
boxes are unknown, and may even be prepared arbitrarily
by the adversary.
Significant efforts have been undertaken to establish
the security of device independent QKD [5–11], leading
to ever more sophisticated security proofs. Initial proofs
assumed a simple model in which the devices act inde-
pendently and identically (i.i.d.) in each round of the
protocol. This significantly simplifies the security analy-
sis since the underlying properties of the devices may first
be estimated by gaining statistical confidence from the
observation of the measurement outcomes in the tested
rounds. The main challenge overcome by the more recent
security proofs [8–11] was to establish security even if the
devices behave arbitrarily from one round to the next, in-
cluding having an arbitrary memory of the past that they
might use to thwart the efforts of Alice and Bob. Assum-
ing that the devices carry at least some memory of past
interactions is an extremely realistic assumption due to
technical limitations, even if Alice and Bob prepare their
own trusted, but imperfect, devices, highlighting the ex-
treme importance of such analyses for the implementa-
tion of device independent QKD. In contrast, relatively
little is known about device independence outside the
realm of QKD [12–16].
Conference key agreement [17–19] (CKA or N-CKA) is
the task of distributing a secret key among N parties. In
order to achieve this goal, one could make use of N − 1
individual QKD protocols to distribute N − 1 different
keys between one of the parties (Alice) and the others
(Bob1, . . . ,BobN−1), followed by Alice using these keys
to encrypt a common key to all the participants. How-
ever the existence of genuine multipartite quantum cor-
relations can bring some advantage to multipartite tasks,
and, as shown in Ref. [19], exploring properties of gen-
uine multipartite entanglement can lead to protocols with
better performance for conference key agreement.
Here we present the first security analysis of confer-
ence key agreement in the most adversarial model of de-
vice independence. Our protocol can be implemented
using any experimental setup that is capable of testing
the Parity-CHSH inequality. The Parity-CHSH inequal-
ity is an inequality we introduce here, that is closely
related to the CHSH inequality and that extends it to
N -parties. Our proof is based on the relation between
the N -partite Parity-CHSH inequality and the CHSH in-
equality [20]. We also compare the asymptotic rates ob-
tained for DICKA with the implementation of N−1 inde-
pendent DIQKD, and show that for some regime of noise
it is advantageous to perform DICKA. The manuscript
is organised as follows: In the next Section we present
the protocol and state the security definitions for confer-
ence key agreement. Then we sketch the security proof
of our DICKA protocol. We finish with a comparison
of the asymptotic key rates. An expanded and detailed
derivation of the security proof and the noise model for
the asymptotic key rates are presented in the Appendix.
I. THE PROTOCOL
For a device independent implementation of CKA, we
consider a protocol with N parties: Alice who possesses
one device with two inputs {0, 1}, and Bob1 possesses
a device with three inputs {0, 1, 2}, an Bob2,. . .,BobN−1
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2possess each a device with two inputs {0, 1}. Every device
has two outputs. During the protocol, Alice and the Bobs
randomly choose some rounds to test for the violation of
the Parity-CHSH inequality. They abort the protocol
if the frequency of rounds where they win the Parity-
CHSH game do not reach a specified threshold δ. We
also consider that Alice has a source for generation of the
states, which is independent of her measurement device.
Protocol 1 (DICKA).
1. For every round i ∈ [n] do:
(a) Alice uses her source to produce and distribute an N -partite state, ρAiB(1...N−1),i , shared among herself
and the N − 1 Bobs.
(b) Alice randomly picks Ti, s.t. P (Ti = 1) = µ, and publicly communicates it to all the Bobs.
(c) If Ti = 0 Alice and the Bobs choose (Xi, Y(1...N−1),i) = (0, 2, 0, ..., 0), and if Ti = 1 Alice chooses Xi ∈R
{0, 1} uniformly at random, Bob1 chooses Y(1),i ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random, and Bob2,. . . ,BobN−1
choose (Y(2...N−1),i) = (1, . . . , 1).
(d) Alice and the Bobs input the previously chosen values in their respective device and record the outputs
as A′i, B′(1...N−1),i.
2. They all communicate publicly the list of bases Xn1 Y(1...N−1)
n
1
they used.
3. Error correction: Alice and the Bobs apply an error correction protocol. We call OA the classical infor-
mation that Alice sends to the Bobs. For the purpose of parameter estimation, the Bobs also send some
error correction information for the bits produced during the test rounds (Ti = 1), we denote O(k) the error
correction information sent by Bobk. If the error correction protocol aborts for at least one Bob then they
abort the protocol. If it does not abort they obtain the raw keys K˜A = A′, K˜B(1...N−1) .
4. Parameter estimation: If Ti = 1, Alice uses A′i and her guess on B′(1...N−1),i to set Ci = 1 if they have
won the N-partite Parity-CHSH game, and to set Ci = 0 if they have lost it. If Ti = 0, she sets Ci = ⊥.
She aborts if
∑
i Ci < δ ·
∑
i Ti, where δ ∈]pmin, pmax[.
5. Privacy amplification: Alice and the Bobs apply a privacy amplification protocol to create final keys
KA,KB(1...N−1) . We denote S the classical information publicly sent by Alice during this step.
Security Definitions. For completeness, before stating
our main result, which establishes the secret key length of
Protocol 1, we first formalise what it means for a DICKA
protocol to be secure. As for QKD [21, 22] the security of
conference key agreement [19] can be split into two terms:
correctness and secrecy. Correctness is a statement about
how sure we are that the N parties share identical keys,
and secrecy is a statement about how much information
the adversary can have about Alice’s key.
Definition 1. (Correctness and secrecy) A DICKA
protocol is corr-correct if Alice’s and Bobs’ keys, KA,
KB(1) , . . . ,KB(N−1) , are all identical with probability at
least 1 − corr. And it is sec-secret, if Alice’s key KA
is sec-close to a key that Eve is ignorant about. This
condition can be formalized as
pΩˆ ·
∥∥∥∥ρKAE|Ωˆ − 1A2l ⊗ ρE|Ωˆ
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ sec,
where ‖ · ‖tr denotes the trace norm, l is the key length,
Ωˆ is the event of the protocol not aborting, and pΩˆ is the
probability for Ωˆ.
If a protocol is corr-correct and sec-secret then it is
s-correct-and-secret for any s ≥ corr + sec.
So in general when we say that a CKA (or a QKD)
protocol is s secure, we mean that for any possible phys-
ical implementation of the protocol, either it aborts with
probability higher than 1 − s or it is s-correct-and-
secret, according to Definition 1 (see Appendix section
2).
A combination of Definition 1 and the Leftover Hash-
ing Lemma [21] relates the length of a secret key, that
can be obtained from a particular protocol, with the
smooth min-entropy of Alice’s raw key A′ conditioned
on Eve’s information (see [21] for a detailed derivation of
this statement): An sec-secret key of size
l = Hmin(A
′|E)− 2 log 1
PA
(1)
3can be obtained, for sec > 2 + PA. The condi-
tional smooth min-entropy is defined as Hmin(A|E)ρ :=
supσ∈B(ρ)Hmin(A|E)σ, with the supremum taken over all
positive semi-definite operators -close to ρ in the puri-
fied distance (see [23]). For A a classical register and
σ a quantum state, Hmin(A|E)σ represents the maxi-
mum probability with which Eve can guess the value of
A if they share the state σ. In general Hmin(A|E)σ :=
supτE sup{λ : σAE ≤ 2−λ1A⊗ τE}, where the supremum
is taken over all quantum states τE .
Definition 1 was proved to be a criteria for composable
security for QKD in the device dependent scenario [22].
However it is important to note that for the DI case it is
not known whether such a criteria is enough for compos-
able security. Indeed, Ref. [24] suggests that this is not
the case if the same devices are used for generation of a
subsequent key, since this new key can leak information
about the first key. Following Ref. [11] we chose to adopt
these definitions as the security criteria for DICKA.
Our main result establishes the length of a secure key
that can be obtained from Protocol 1.
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 generates an s-correct-and-
secret key, with s ≤ PA + 2(N − 1)′EC + 2 + EA, of
length:
l = max
pmin≤δopt≤pmax
(
(f(δ, δopt)− µ) · n− v˜
√
n
)
+ 3 log(1−
√
1− (/4)2)− 2 log(−1PA) (2)
− leakEC(OA)−
N−1∑
k=1
leakEC(O(k)),
where ′EC is an error parameter of the error cor-
rection protocol, PA is the privacy amplification er-
ror probability, EA is a chosen security parame-
ter for the protocol, and  is a smoothing param-
eter. δ is the specified threshold bellow which the
protocol aborts. The function f( · , δopt) is the tan-
gent of fˆ(·) (see Eq. (8)) in the point δopt, where
δopt ∈]pmin, pmax[ is a parameter to be optimized.
v˜ = 2
(
log(13) + (fˆ ′(popt)/µ + 1)
)√
1− 2 log( · EA) +
2 log(7)
√
− log(2EA(1−
√
1− (/4)2)). And the leakages
due to error correction, leakEC, can be estimated accord-
ing to a particular implementation of the protocol.
The security proof of Protocol 1 consists of two main
steps: We first use the recently developed Entropy Ac-
cumulation Theorem [25] to split the overall entropy of
Alice’s string, produced during the protocol, into a sum
of the entropy produced on each round of the protocol.
Then we develop a new method to bound the entropy
produced in one round by a function of the violation of
the N -partite Parity-CHSH inequality, which generalises
the bound for the bipartite case derived in [5, 6]. In
the following Section we sketch the steps of the proof of
Theorem 1. An expanded and detailed derivation of this
result is presented in the Appendix.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Step 1: Breaking the entropy round by round with the
Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT). To prove the se-
curity of Protocol 1 we need to lower bound the smooth
min-entropy of the string produced by Alice’s device con-
ditioned on all the information Eve obtains during the
protocol (evaluated on the output state of Protocol 1
given the event Ωˆ of not aborting.),
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 OAO(1...N−1)E
)
ρ|Ωˆ
, (3)
where E denotes Eve’s quantum side information and
all the other registers have been defined in Proto-
col 1. We can treat the error correction information
OAO(1...N−1)that is communicated between Alice and the
Bobs as as a leakage:
(3) ≥Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ|Ωˆ
− leakEC(OA)−
N−1∑
k=1
leakEC(O(k)).
(4)
This relation follows from the properties of the smooth
min-entropy (see [26, Lemma 6.8]).
Now, in order to bound the term
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ|Ωˆ
, we use the En-
tropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) [25]. The EAT
has already been used to prove security of device
independent QKD [11]. This theorem permits to lower
bound the above entropy by a sum of Von Neumann
entropies evaluated on each round i. More precisely:
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ|Ωˆ
≥ nt− v√n,
(5)
where v is a prefactor independent of the num-
ber of rounds and t is a lower bound (for ev-
ery round i) on the Von Neumann entropy
H(A′i|Xi1Y(1...N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1E)Mi(σ) for all initial
states σ that would achieve a Bell violation larger than
the chosen threshold δ (see Appendix Section 1 d).
The EAT then reduces the security proof in the most
adversarial scenario to the estimation of t.
Step 2: Bounding the entropy by a function of the Bell vi-
olation. We now proceed to lower bound t for Protocol 1,
i.e. we find a lower bound on the Von Neumann entropy
H(A′i|Xi1Y(1...N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1E)Mi(σ) as a function of the
violation of the Parity-CHSH inequality for N parties.
The Parity-CHSH inequality is anN -partite Bell inequal-
ity that reduces to the CHSH inequality for N = 2.
The CHSH inequality can be formulated as a bound
on the winning probability of the following bipartite
game. Let Alice and Bob be the two players in this game
called the CHSH game. At the beginning of the game,
they are both asked a uniformly random binary question
4x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} respectively. They then have
to answer bit a and b respectively. They win the game if
and only if
a+ b = xy mod 2.
No communication is allowed between Alice and Bob dur-
ing the game. They can, however, agree on any strategy
before the start of the game. The CHSH inequality states
that by using a classical strategy (a non-quantum strat-
egy)1 Alice and Bob’s winning probability must satisfy
the following,
PCHSHwin ≤
3
4
. (6)
By a small change in the CHSH inequality we can ex-
tend it to N > 2 parties.
Definition 2 (Parity-CHSH). The Parity-CHSH in-
equality extends the CHSH inequality to N parties as fol-
lows. Let Alice, Bob1, . . . , BobN−1 be the N players
of the following game (the Parity-CHSH game). Alice
and Bob1 are asked uniformly random binary questions
x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} respectively. The other Bobs are
each asked a fixed question, e.g. always equal to 1. Alice
will answer bit a, and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, Bobi answers
bit bi. We denote by b¯ :=
⊕
2≤i≤N−1 bi, the parity of all
the answers of Bob2,. . . ,BobN−1. The players win if and
only if
a+ b1 = x(y + b¯) mod 2.
As for the CHSH inequality, classical strategies for the
Partity-CHSH game must satisfy,
PParity−CHSHwin ≤
3
4
. (7)
Remark 1. Note that if we condition on b¯ = 0, the game
is essentially the CHSH game. When conditioned on b¯ =
1 the Parity-CHSH game reduces to a game equivalent to
the CHSH up to relabelling the question y. We will use
this to later prove that the function fˆ defined in eq. (8)
lower bounds some entropy of interest.
We can use the violation of this inequal-
ity to lower the von Neumann entropy H :=
H(A′i|Xi1Y(1...N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1E)Mi(σ). We can do this by
using that the Parity-CHSH inequality is very similar
to the CHSH inequality and that Ref. [5] essentially
lowerbounds H as a function of the violation CHSH
inequality.
Theorem 2. The function fˆ defined below lower bounds
H.
fˆ(pw) :=
(
1− µ
2
)(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw − 2)2 − 1
))
, (8)
1 strategies that can be modeled with local hidden variables
where pw is a shorthand notation for P
Parity−CHSH
win , and
where the winning probability is evaluated on the state
Mi(σ) on which the entropy is evaluated.
Sketch of proof. We first notice that since Pr(Xi = 0) =
(1− µ2 ),
H =
(
1− µ
2
)
H(A′i|Xi−11 Y(1,...,N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1E,Xi = 0)
+
µ
2
H(A′i|Xi−11 Y(1,...,N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1E,Xi = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥
(
1− µ
2
)
H(A′i|Xi−11 Y(1,...,N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1E,Xi = 0).
The above inequality holds since A′i is a classical register.
Conditioned on Xi = 0, A′i is independent of Y(1,...,N−1)i
and of Ti, and in the following, R denotes the registers
Xi−11 Y(1,...,N−1)
i−1
1
A′i−11 T
i−1
1 E so that,
H(A′i|Xi−11 Y(1,...,N−1)i1A′
i−1
1 T
i
1EXi = 0)
= H(A′i|RXi = 0).
It remains to lower bound H(A′i|R,Xi = 0). We first
lower bound it by
H(A′i|RXi = 0) ≥ H(A′i|R,Xi = 0, b¯),
where b¯ is the register that contains the parity bit of the
outcome of Bob2,. . . ,BobN−1. We can then expand the
Von Neumann entropy as,
H(A′i|RXi = 0, b¯) =pb¯=0H(A′i|R,Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)
+ pb¯=1H(A
′
i|R,Xi = 0, b¯ = 1).
From [5] we have that (1− µ2 )H(A′i|R,Xi = 0, b¯ =
0) ≥ fˆ(pw|b¯=0) and (1 − µ2 )H(A′i|R,Xi = 0, b¯ = 1) ≥
fˆ(pw|b¯=1). Indeed, from Remark 1 we have that condi-
tioned on b¯ = 0 the Parity-CHSH game is simply a CHSH
game, therefore pw|b¯=0 is equal to PCHSHwin when evalu-
ated on the state shared between Alice and Bob1 con-
ditioned on b¯ = 0. Moreover [5] precisely lower bounds
(1 − µ2 )H(A′i|RXi = 0, b¯ = 0) by fˆ
(
PCHSHwin
)
. The same
reasoning holds for b¯ = 1.
As a consequence,(
1−µ
2
)
H(A′i|RXi = 0, b¯)
≥ pb¯=0fˆ(pw|b¯=0) + pb¯=1fˆ(pw|b¯=1).
By convexity of the function fˆ , we get,(
1−µ
2
)
H(A′i|RXi = 0, b¯) ≥fˆ
(
pb¯=0pw|b¯=0 + pb¯=1pˆw|b¯=1
)
=fˆ
(
pw
)
,
and therefore H ≥ fˆ(pw).
5III. ASYMPTOTIC KEY RATE AND
COMPARISON WITH DIQKD BASED
PROTOCOL
We remark that bipartite QKD has of course been
studied in the device independent setting [11], but as we
are going to see in Figure 1, a conference key agreement
protocol can be beneficial for certain regimes of noise.
Combining Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) we get a lower bound
on the length of secret key we can obtain with Protocol 1,
which, when divided by the number of rounds n, gives us
a lower bound on the secret key rate.
In order to calculate the secret key rate, we also need
to estimate the leakages due to error correction, Eq. (4),
and for that we need to specify the model for an honest
implementation. Modeling the noise on the distributed
state as a depolarising noise we get:
leakEC(OA) ≤ ((1− µ)h(Q) + µ)n+O(
√
n), (9)
and
leakEC(O(k)) ≤ µn+O(
√
n), (10)
where Q is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) between
Alice and one of the Bobs. A detailed calculation of the
leakage for this particular noise model is presented in
Appendix Section 3.
Using this estimation of the leakage in the bounds for
the entropy (3), and by taking µ → 0, s.t. µ√n → ∞,
we get the asymptotic key rate for Protocol 1:
rN−CKA,∞ = 1− h
12 + 12
√√√√√16
√1− 2QN
2
√
2
+
(1− 2Q)
(
1−√1− 2QN−2
)
8
√
2
2 − 1
− h(Q). (11)
We compare the above rate with the one we would have
if Alice was performing N − 1 DIQKD protocols in order
to establish a common key with all the Bobs [11]:
r∞
(N−1)×DIQKD =
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2(1− 2Q)2 − 1
)
− h(Q)
N − 1 .
(12)
Because when Alice runs N − 1 DIQKD protocols she
needs n rounds for each of the N − 1 Bobs, the key rate
r∞
(N−1)×DIQKD gets a factor of
1
N−1 . Note that here we
consider that the cost for locally producing an N -partite
GHZ state is comparable to the cost of producing EPR
pairs. An analysis taking into account these costs for
particular implementations will lead to a more fair com-
parison.
A comparison of these key rate is given in Figure 1,
where we see that in some regime of noise, it can be
advantageous to use the N -partite DICKA Protocol 1
instead of N − 1 independent DIQKD protocols.
IV. CONCLUSION
We presented the first security proof for a fully de-
vice independent implementation of conference key agree-
ment. We have shown that, in principle, security can be
achieved for any violation of the Parity-CHSH inequality.
We have compared the asymptotic key rates achieved
with the DICKA protocol versus N − 1 implementations
of DIQKD, modelling the quantum channel connecting
the parties as depolarising channels. For implementa-
tions where the cost of local generation of GHZ states
and EPR pairs is comparable, we show that it is advan-
tageous to use DICKA for low noise regimes. A careful
analysis that takes into account the costs of generation of
the states is still needed for particular implementations.
We remark that proving advantage for a small number
of parties already leads to better protocols for networks.
Indeed, instead of using DIQKD as building block for an
N -DICKA protocol (for large N), one can use k-DICKA
protocols, upon availability of k-GHZ states for k = 3, 4
or 5.
Finally, we also remark that our DICKA protocol can
be adapted for other multipartite Bell inequalities. How-
ever, in general, finding good lower bounds on Eve’s in-
formation about Alice’s output as a function of the Bell
violation is a difficult task.
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This updated version corrects a mistake we have made
in the previous version. This mistake is discussed in
[arXiv:1906.01710].
In order to be clear for the reader we give here some
explanations. In the former version of the article we
present a protocol for device-independent conference key
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Figure 1. Asymptotic key rate for N -DICKA (dashed lines),
and for the distribution of a secret key between N parties
through N−1 DIQKD protocols (solid lines), when each qubit
experiences independent bit errors measured at a bit error
rate (QBER) Q. From top to bottom, the lines correspond
to N = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. We observe that for low noise regime it
is advantageous to use DICKA instead of (N − 1)×DIQKD
[11]. In general, the comparison between the two methods
depends on the cost and noisiness of producing GHZ states
over pairwise EPR pairs.
agreement (CKA) between N parties, Alice, Bob1,. . . ,
BobN−1, using an N -partite GHZ state ((|0〉⊗N +
|1〉⊗N )/√2). The protocol, aiming to be secure in the
device-independent settings, relies on a statistical Bell
test. In particular, in the former version of the arti-
cle we present the N -partite Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-
Klyshko (MABK) inequality. However, using this in-
equality with the GHZ state, leads to a protocol that
is secure but does not produce key. The intuition for
that is the following.
1. In order to ensure security, the protocol requires
that the state and the measurement are such that
they can achieve a sufficiently high violation of the
MABK inequality. To do so using the GHZ state,
Alice’s observables A0 and A1 need to be in the
XY plane of the Bloch sphere.
2. In order to generate key that is correlated with the
Bobs, Alice needs to have at least one of her observ-
ables (either A0 or A1) that is equal to the Pauli Z
operator.
The two above conditions about A0 and A1 cannot si-
multaneously be true.
Moreover even if there is no noise in the protocol, if Al-
ice measures the GHZ state with a measurement in the
XY plane, her outcomes will be completely uncorrelated
with Bobs’ outcomes. Therefore no key can be produced,
even though violation of the MABK inequality ensures
that Alice outcomes have high entropy conditioned on
Eve. As a consequence, the protocol of the former version
of the article will abort at almost every honest execution,
and hence no key is produced. Of course one could con-
sider measuring the GHZ state in a basis in between the
Z basis and the XY plane. However, this would at best
lead to very low key rate, and it would at worst not be
sufficient to get any key at all, causing the protocol to
always abort.
We solve this issue by changing the inequality we use
in the protocol. The new inequality (the Parity-CHSH
inequality) we introduce in this update is such that viola-
tion can be achieved by measuring in the Z basis, which
ensures that entropy conditioned on Eve of Alice’s mea-
surement outcomes in the Z basis is high. Furthermore,
when all the parties measure the GHZ state in the Z ba-
sis they should get the same outcome (in the noiseless
scenario), which allows for the production of a shared bit
string (the key). If a small amount of noise is present,
the errors it induces can be corrected by an error cor-
rection procedure as already presented in the protocol of
the former version of the article.
7APPENDIX
Here we expand in detail upon the security proof of the device independent conference key agreement protocol
(DICKA) presented in the main text, Protocol 1. A more detailed version of Protocol 1 is given in this appendix in
Protocol 2.
The Appendix is organized as follows: In Section 1 we introduce some background. We start by introducing
the notation and some definitions which are going to be used in the main proofs. Then we present the entropy
accumulation theorem (EAT), which constitutes an important tool of our security proof. We finish discussing the
set of hypothesis contained in the device independent (DI) model. In Section 2, we state the DICKA protocol and
present the detailed security proof. In Section 3 we present the noise model to compare the asymptotic key rate of
the DICKA protocol to the case where the parties perform N − 1 independent DIQKD protocols in order to generate
a common key.
1. Preliminaries
a. Notation
We denote HA the Hilbert space of the system A with dimension |A| and HAB := HA⊗HB the Hilbert space of the
composite system, with ⊗ the tensor product. By L(H), Sa(H), P(H) and S(H) we mean the set of linear, self-adjoint,
positive semidefinite and (quantum) density operators on H, respectively. For two operators A,B ∈ Sa(H), A ≥ B
means (A−B) ∈ P(H). ForM ∈ L(H), we denote |M | :=
√
M†M , and the Schatten p-norm ‖M‖p := tr(|M |p)1/p for
p ∈ [1,∞[, and ‖M‖∞ is the largest singular value ofM . ForM ∈ P(H),M−1 is the generalised inverse ofM , meaning
that the relation MM−1M = M holds. If ρAB ∈ S(HAB) then we denote ρA := trB(ρAB) and ρB := trA(ρAB) to
be the respective reduced states. We use [n] as a shorthand for {1, . . . , n}. If we deal with a system composed with
N subsystems within a round i of a protocol we denote A(k...l),i for A(k),i, . . . A(l),i (k, l ∈ [N ] : k ≤ l), where A(k),i
is the kth subsystem of the round i. If we deal with a system composed of n subsystems across the n rounds of
a protocol we denote Alk for Ak, . . . , Al (k, l ∈ [n] : k ≤ l). Therefore A(k...l)om is a short for A(k...l),m, . . . A(k...l),o
(k, l ∈ [N ],m, o ∈ [n] : k ≤ l,m ≤ o).
For classical-quantum states (or cq-states)
ρXA :=
∑
x∈X
px · |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρA|x,
where {px} is a probability distribution on the alphabet X of X. We define a cq-state ρXA|Ω conditioned on an event
Ω ⊂ X as,
ρXA|Ω :=
1
pΩ
∑
x∈Ω
px · |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρA|x, where pΩ :=
∑
x∈Ω
px. (A.1)
We will denote by CPTP maps the linear maps that are Completely Positive and Trace Preserving.
Let C be an alphabet, and C1, . . . , Cn be n random variables on this alphabet. We call freq(Cn1 ) the vector whose
components labeled by c ∈ C are the frequencies of the symbol c:
freq(Cn1 )c :=
|{i : Ci = c}|
n
.
b. Entropies
Throughout this work we will make use the smooth min- (max-) entropy. To define them we first define the min-
and max-entropies [26].
Definition 3. If ρAB is a bipartite state and  ∈]0, 1[, we define the min- and max-entropies as,
Hmin(A|B)ρ := − log
(
inf
σB
‖ρ 12ABσ
− 12
B ‖2∞
)
(A.2)
Hmax(A|B)ρ := log
(
sup
σB
‖ρ 12ABσ
− 12
B ‖21
)
, (A.3)
8where the infimum and the supremum are taken over all states σB ∈ S(B). Their smooth versions are defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := sup
ρˆAB
Hmin(A|B)ρˆ (A.4)
Hmax(A|B)ρ := inf
ρˆAB
Hmax(A|B)ρˆ, (A.5)
where the supremum and infimum are over all operators ρˆAB ∈ P(HAB) in a -ball (in the purified distance) centered
in ρAB. Moreover if A is classical, the optimization can be restricted to an -ball in S(HAB).
c. Markov Condition
The technique we are going to use for the security analysis of our DICKA protocol strongly relies on the fact that
some variables satisfy the so-called Markov Condition.
Definition 4 (Markov Condition). Let ρABC be a state in S(HABC). We say that ρABC satisfies the Markov condition
A↔ B ↔ C if and only if
I(A : C|B)ρ = 0, (A.6)
where I(A : C|B)ρ is the mutual information between A and C conditioned on B for the state ρABC .
This condition becomes trivial when A B and C are independent random variables. For more details on the
definition of the Markov condition see [25, section 2.2 & appendix C].
d. The Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT)
The security proof of our DICKA protocol makes use of a very powerful tool called Entropy Accumulation Theorem
(EAT), recently introduced in [25]. The EAT relates the smooth min- (max-) entropy of N subsystems to the Von
Neumann entropy of each subsystem. In this section we recall some necessary definitions from [25] and state the EAT.
The entropy accumulation theorem applies to states of the form,
ρCn1 An1Bn1 E := (trRn ◦Mn ◦ . . . ◦M1 ⊗ 1E)(ρR0E), (A.7)
for some initial state ρR0E ∈ S(HR0E) and, ∀i ∈ [n],Mi is a EAT channel defined as follows.
Definition 5 (EAT channels (from [27])). For i ∈ [n] we callMi a EAT channel ifMi is a CPTP map from Rn−1
to CiAiBiRi such that ∀i ∈ [n]:
1. Ai, Bi, Ci are finite dimensional systems, Ci is classical and Ri is an arbitrary quantum system.
2. For any state σRi−1R, where R is isomorphic to Ri−1, the output state σRiAiBiCiR := (Mi⊗1R)σRi−1R is such
that the classical register Ci can be measured from σAiBi .
3. Any state defined as in (A.7) satisfies the following Markov conditions,
∀i ∈ [n], Ai−11 ↔ Bi−11 E ↔ Bi. (A.8)
To state EAT we also need the notion of min- and max-tradeoff functions. Let P(C) be the set of distributions on
the alphabet C of Ci. For any q ∈ P(C) we define the set of states
Σi(q) := {σCiAiBiRiR = (Mi ⊗ 1R)(σRi−1R) : σRi−1R ∈ S(HRi−1R) & σCi = q}. (A.9)
Definition 6. A real function f on P(C) is called a min-tradeoff function for a mapMi if
fi(q) ≤ inf
σ∈Σi(q)
H(Ai|BiR)σ, (A.10)
and max-tradeoff function for a mapMi if
fi(q) ≥ sup
σ∈Σi(q)
H(Ai|BiR)σ. (A.11)
If Σi(q) = ∅, the infimum is taken to be +∞ and the supremum −∞.
9We can now state the EAT.
Theorem 3 (EAT from [25], Theorem 4.4).
LetM1, . . . ,Mn be a EAT channel and ρCn1 An1Bn1 E be a state as defined in (A.7), let h ∈ R, f be an affine min-tradeoff
function for all the mapsMi , i ∈ [n], and  ∈]0, 1[. For any event Ω ⊂ Cn such that f(freq(Cn1 )) ≥ h,
Hmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω ≥ nh− v
√
n, (A.12)
where v = 2(log(1 + 2dA) + d‖∇f‖∞e)
√
1− 2 log( · pΩ), where dA is the maximum dimension of the system Ai. On
the other hand we have,
Hmax(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω ≤ nh˜+ v
√
n, (A.13)
where we replace f by an affine max-tradeoff function f˜ , such that the event Ω implies h˜ ≥ f˜(freq(Cn1 )).
e. Device Independent assumptions
When dealing with cryptographic tasks it is important to be precise under which assumptions a protocol is proven
secure. If an assumption is not satisfied in a particular implementation, the entire security of the protocol may be
compromised. The device independent framework allows one to relax many strong assumptions about the underlying
system and devices, however some assumptions (without which we can probably not achieve any security) are still
present and it is important to make them explicit. In the following we state the assumptions present in our model,
which constitutes the standard set of assumptions made in all device independent protocols. This minimal set of
assumptions is crucial for security in the device independent framework, as a relaxation of any of them compromises
the security of the protocol.
Assumptions 1. Our DICKA protocol considers N parties, namely Alice, Bob1, . . . ,BobN−1, and the eavesdropper,
Eve. They satisfy the following assumptions:
1. Each party is in a lab which is isolated from the outside (in particular from Eve). As a consequence no non-
intended information can go in or out of the labs.
2. Each party holds a trusted random number generator (RNG).
3. All classical communications between the parties are assumed to be authenticated, and all classical operations
are assumed to be trusted.
4. Each party has a measurement device in their lab in which they can input classical information and which outputs
0 or 1. The measurement devices are otherwise arbitrary, and therefore could be prepared by Eve.
5. Alice has a source that produces some N partite quantum state ρAiB(1...N−1),i in the round i. We allow Eve to
hold the purification of ρAn1B(1...N−1)n1 (the state between Alice and the Bobs for the n rounds of the protocol) and
we denote the pure global state ρAn1B(1...N−1)n1E. This source is also assumed to be arbitrary, and therefore we
can assume that it is prepared by Eve.
6. We will assume that Alice’s source and her measurement device are independent (e.g. Alice can isolate the source
from the measurement device). Therefore there is no non-intended communication between the source and her
measurement device.
Point 6 of Assumptions 1 is usually not explicitly stated in previous works on device independent QKD, however we
remark that this assumption is also present in all previous protocols. Indeed assumption 6 is important to guarantee
that no extra information about the outcomes of Alice’s device is leaked to Eve (since Alice and Bob are in isolated
labs), apart from what she can learn from the purifying system in her possession and the classical communication
intentionally leaked during the protocol. Previous protocols usually assume that an external source is responsible
for producing the states. However note that in order to distribute the states to Alice and Bob’s devices one need a
quantum channel connecting the external source with their labs, and similarly it is assumed that no information from
the devices is leaked through this quantum channel. An alternative approach is to assume that the full state for the
n rounds of the protocol is already shared between the two parties at the very beginning of the protocol (and any
quantum channel connecting the source and the devices is disconnected once the protocol starts). However this is an
unrealistic assumption, since an implementation of such protocol would require quantum memory to last for the entire
duration of the protocol. For that reason, here we chose NOT to assume that the state is already shared among all
the parties, and assumption 6 prevents the simple attack described in [28, Appendix C], where the outcome of round
i is leaked throughout the state transmitted to Bob in the next rounds.
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2. From self-testing to Device Independent Conference Key Agreement
The Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [20] has been successfully used to prove security of DIQKD
[27] in the most adversarial scenario, where only a minimal set of assumptions (similar to Assumptions 1) is required.
The main point of using the CHSH inequality for cryptographic protocols is due to its self-testing properties, which
allows one to derive properties about the devices used during the protocol. Therefore, in order to prove the security
of Device Independent Conference Key Agreement (DICKA) it is very natural to think of an N -partite extension of
the CHSH inequality.
In this section we will start by introducing our new N -partite Parity-CHSH inequality, which we devise in such a
way that it closely relates to the CHSH inequality. Then, we presents our DICKA protocol in details and prove its
security using the connection between our Parity-CHSH inequality and the CHSH inequality.
From CHSH inequality to “Parity-CHSH” inequality.
In this section we present our new Parity-CHSH inequality, that is derived from the CHSH inequality in such a way
that an N -partite GHZ state can maximally violate it.
The CHSH inequality [20] a two-partite inequality that has already proven its usefulness for device-independent
protocols [5, 6, 8–10, 13, 27, 29, 30]. In this section we introduce a slightly different inequality for N parties.
Indeed we use the fact that an N−partite GHZ state can be turned into either Φ+ := (|00〉+|11〉)(〈00|+〈11|)2 or Φ− :=
(|00〉−|11〉)(〈00|−〈11|)
2 . by measuring N − 2 parties in the X basis. More precisely if the parity of the outcomes of the
N − 2 measurements in the X basis is 0 then the state on the remaining 2 parties is Φ+, and if the parity of these
outcomes is 1 then the state on the remaining systems is Φ−.
The state Φ+ can be used to maximally violate the CHSH inequality, and Φ− can be used to maximally violate an
equivalent inequality. Therefore one would expect that the GHZ state can violate a mixing these two CHSH inequality
depending on whether we create a state Φ+ or Φ−.
More precisely, The CHSH inequality can be formulated as a bound on the winning probability of the following
bipartite game.
Definition 7 (CHSH inequality). Let Alice and Bob be the two players in this game called the CHSH game. At the
beginning of the game, they are both asked a uniformly random binary question x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
They then have to answer bit a and b respectively. They win the game if and only if
a+ b = xy mod 2.
No communication is allowed between Alice and Bob during the game. They can, however, agree on any strategy before
the start of the game. The CHSH inequality states that by using a classical strategy – i.e. modeled with local hidden
variables – Alice and Bob’s winning probability must satisfy the following,
PCHSHwin ≤
3
4
. (A.14)
The state Φ+ allows to reach the maximum winning probability achievable by quantum mechanics, i.e. it allows
for PCHSHwin =
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
≈ 0.85. Similarirly Φ− allows to reach the maximum winning probability achievable quantum
mechanics(Pwin ≈ 0.85) for a game equivalent (up to relabelling) to the CHSH game, in which the winning condition
is a+ b = x(y + 1) mod 2.
Our new “Parity-CHSH” inequality extends the CHSH inequality to N parties as follows.
Definition 8 (Parity-CHSH inequality). Let Alice, Bob1, . . . , BobN−1 be the N players of the following game
(the Parity-CHSH game). Alice and Bob1 are asked uniformly random binary questions x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1}
respectively. The other Bobs are each asked a fixed question, e.g. always equal to 1. The parties all answer bits
a, b1, . . . , bN−1 respectively. We denote by,
b¯ :=
⊕
2≤i≤N−1
bi,
the parity of the all answers of Bob2,. . . ,BobN−1. The players win if and only if
a+ b1 = x(y + b¯) mod 2. (A.15)
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No communication is allowed between Alice and Bob during the game. They can, however, agree on any strategy before
the start of the game. As for the CHSH inequality, classical strategies for the Partity-CHSH game must satisfy,
PParity−CHSHwin ≤
3
4
. (A.16)
Remark 2. Note that if we condition on b¯ = 0, the game is essentially the CHSH game. When conditioned on b¯ = 1
the Parity-CHSH game reduces to a game equivalent to the CHSH up to relabelling the question y.
Device Independent Conference Key Agreement
We now present a device independent conference key agreement (DICKA) protocol and prove its security in two
steps. We first use the recently developed Entropy Accumulation Theorem [25] to split the overall entropy of Alice’s
string produced during the protocol, into a sum of entropy produced on each round of the protocol. Then we use the
relation between the Parity-CHSH inequality and the CHSH inequality, to bound the entropy produced in one round
by a function of the violation of the N -partite Parity-CHSH inequeality, which generalize the bounds found for the
bipartite case in [6].
The protocol
Before we describe our DICKA protocol let us first state the security definitions for DICKA. We follow the definitions
given in [27] for DIQKD and generalise it to the multipartite case.
Definition 9. (Correctness) We will call a DICKA protocol corr-correct for an implementation, if Alice’s and Bobs’
keys, KA, KB(1) , . . . ,KB(N−1) , are all identical with probability at least 1− corr.
Definition 10. (Secrecy) We say that a DICKA protocol is sec-secret for an implementation, if conditioned on not
aborting Alice’s key KA is sec-close to a key that Eve is ignorant about. More formally for a key of length l, we want
pΩˆ ·
∥∥∥∥ρKAE|Ωˆ − 1A2l ⊗ ρE|Ωˆ
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ sec,
where Ωˆ is the event of the protocol not aborting, and pΩˆ is the probability for Ωˆ.
Note that if a protocol is corr-correct and sec-secret then it is s-correct-and-secret for s ≥ corr + sec.
Definition 11 (Security). A DICKA protocol is called (s, c, l)-secure if:
1. (Soundness) For any implementation of the protocol, either it aborts with probability greater than 1− s or it is
s-correct-and-secret.
2. (Completeness) There exists a honest implementation of the protocol such that the probability of aborting the
protocol is less than c, that is 1− pΩˆ ≤ c.
We remark again that Definition 11 was proven to be a criteria for composable security for Quantum Key Distri-
bution in the device dependent scenario [22]. However, for the device independent case it is not known whether such
a criteria is enough for composable security. Indeed, Ref. [24] suggests that this is not the case if the same devices
are used for generation of a subsequent key since this new key can leak information about the first key. Following
Ref. [27] we chose to adopt Definition 11 as the security criteria for DICKA.
We now prove that the DICKA Protocol 2, under the Assumptions 1, satisfies the above definitions of security. For
completeness we re-state the protocol here.
Protocol 2 (More detail version of Protocol 1). The protocol runs as follows for N parties:
1. For every round i ∈ [n] do:
(a) Alice uses her source to produce and distribute an N -partite state, ρAiB(1...N−1),i , shared among herself
and the N − 1 Bobs.
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(b) Alice randomly picks Ti , s.t. P (Ti = 1) = µ, and publicly communicates it to all the Bobs.
(c) If Ti = 0 Alice and the Bobs choose (Xi, Y(1...N−1),i) = (0, 2, 0, ..., 0), and if Ti = 1 Alice chooses Xi ∈R
{0, 1} uniformly at random, Bob1 chooses Y(1),i ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random, and Bob2,. . . ,BobN−1
choose (Y(2...N−1),i) = (1, . . . , 1).
(d) Alice and the Bobs input the value they chose previously in their respective device and record the output
as A′i, B′(1...N−1),i
2. They all communicate publicly the list of bases Xn1 Y(1...N−1)
n
1
they used.
3. Error correction: Alice and the Bobs apply an error correction protocol. Here we chose a protocol based
on universal hashing [31, 32]. If the error correction protocol aborts for at least one Bob then they abort the
protocol. If it does not abort they obtain the raw keys K˜A, K˜B(1...N−1) . We call OA the classical information
that Alice has sent to the Bobs during the error correction protocol. Also the Bobs will send some error
correction information but only for the bits produced during the testing rounds (Ti = 1), for the purpose
of parameter estimation. We call Alice’s guess on Bobs’ strings G(1...N−1), and we denote O(k) the error
correction information sent by Bobk.
4. Parameter estimation: For all the rounds i such that Ti = 1, Alice uses A′i and her guess on B′(1...N−1),i
to set Ci = 1 if they have won the N-partite Parity-CHSH game in the round i, and she sets Ci = 0 if they
have lost it. Finally she sets Ci = ⊥ for the rounds i where Ti = 0. She aborts if
∑
i Ci < δ ·
∑
i Ti, where
δ ∈]3/4, 1/2 + 1/2√2[.
5. Privacy amplification: Alice and the Bobs apply a privacy amplification protocol (namely the universal
hashing described in [33]) to create final keys KA,KB(1...N−1) . We call S the classical information that Alice
sent to the Bobs during the privacy amplification protocol.
Note that the above Protocol 2 is very similar to the DIQKD protocol given in [27], the difference being that since
N parties are present here we use a shared N -partite GHZ state, instead of EPR pairs, and we have to add error
corrections. Indeed we have an error correction protocol that permits all the parties to get the same raw key. But
since we have N parties involved in the protocol, at least one of the parties needs to know all the other parties’ outputs
for the testing rounds (when Ti = 1) in order to estimate, in the parameter estimation phase, how many times do
they succeed in the Parity-CHSH game. For simplicity of the analysis we choose, in Protocol 2, to communicate this
information through error correction protocols.
In the ideal scenario (when there is no noise and no interference of Eve) the state ρAn1B(1...N−1)n1 produced corresponds
to n copies of the N -partite GHZ state, distributed across the N parties, and Alice and the Bobs measure the following
observables:
1. Alice’s observable for Xi = 0 is σZ and for Xi = 1 it is σX .
2. Bob1 uses observable σZ when Y(1),i = 2, σZ+σX√2 when Y(1),i = 0, and
σZ−σX√
2
when Y(1),i = 1.
3. For the other Bobs, they have the observable σZ for Y(k),i = 0, and for Y(k),i = 1 they have observable σX .
In the next sections we are going to present the detailed proof of the following main result:
Theorem 4. Let EC, ′EC ∈]0, 1[ be the two error parameters of the error correction protocol as described in the
Section 2, PA ∈]0, 1[ be the privacy amplification error probability, EA ∈]0, 1[ be a chosen security parameter for
Protocol 2, and  ∈]0, 1[ be a smoothing parameter. Protocol 2 is (s, c, l)-secure according to Definition 11, with
s ≤ PA + 2(N − 1)′EC + 2+ EA, c ≤ (N − 1)(2EC + ′EC) +
(
1− µ
(
1− exp [− 2(pexp − δ)2]))n, and
l = max
3/4≤ poptµ ≤1/2+1/2
√
2
(
(f(qˆ, popt)− µ) · n− v˜
√
n
)
+ 3 log(1−
√
1− (/4)2)− 2 log(−1PA)
− leakEC(OA)−
N−1∑
k=1
leakEC(O(k)),
(A.17)
where v˜ = 2
(
log(13)+(fˆ ′(popt)+1)
)√
1− 2 log( · EA)+2 log(7)
√
− log(2EA(1−
√
1− (/4)2)), popt ∈]µ3/4, µ(1/2+
1/2
√
2)[ is a parameter to be optimized: more precisely popt is the unique point were the tangent function f( · , popt) to
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the function fˆ(·) (see Lemma 3) is such that f(popt, popt) = fˆ(popt) (by convexity of fˆ we have ∀x ∈ [0, 1] f(x, popt) ≤
fˆ(x)). Finally pexp is the expected winning probability to win a single round of the Parity-CHSH game for a honest
implementation, δ ∈]3/4, 1/2 + 1/2√2[ is the threshold defined in Protocol 2, and qˆ is the vector (µδ, µ− µδ, 1− µ)t.
Correctness
The correctness of Protocol 2 comes from the first part of the error correction protocol used by the parties, where
Alice sends information to the Bobs so that they generate the raw keys K˜A, K˜B(1...N−1) . We want here an error correc-
tion protocol that uses only communication from Alice to the Bobs and that minimizes the amount of communication
needed. Therefore we are going to use an error correction protocol as the one described in [31, 32]. The idea of this
error correction code is that Alice chooses a hash function and sends to the Bobs the chosen function and the hashed
value of her bits. We denote this communication OA. Then each Bobk will individually use OA and his own prior
knowledge B(k)n1XA
n
1Y(1...N−1)
n
1
Tn1 to guess Alice’s string. Each of the Bobs can fail to produce a guess, so if one
of them fails the protocol aborts. In an honest implementation of the protocol, the probability that one particular
Bob, say Bobk (k ∈ [N − 1]), aborts is upper bounded by EC. Therefore the probability that at least one of them
aborts in an honest implementation is at most (N − 1)EC. If for k ∈ [N − 1] Bobk does not abort we then have that
P (K˜A 6= K˜B(k)) ≤ ′EC. Therefore if none of the Bobs aborts we have that,
P
(
K˜A = K˜B(1) = . . . = K˜B(N−1)
)
= 1− P (K˜A 6= K˜B(1) OR . . .OR K˜A 6= K˜B(N−1))
≥ 1− (N − 1)′EC ≥ 1− corr,
where we take corr ≥ (N − 1)′EC, which proves the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The Protocol 2 is corr-correct, for any corr ≥ (N − 1)′EC, where ′EC is such that if ∀k ∈ [N − 1] Bobk
does not abort the error correction protocol then P (K˜A 6= K˜B(k)) ≤ ′EC .
Completeness
We call an honest implementation of the protocol, an implementation where the measurement devices used act
in the same way in all the rounds of the protocol, the state used for the n rounds is of the form ρ⊗nAB(1...N−1) (the
measurements and the state are then said to be identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.)), and such that for
one single round, the probability of winning the N partite Parity-CHSH game is pexp ∈
]
3/4, 1/2 + 1/2
√
2
]
.
Lemma 2. For any parameter δ ∈ ]3/4, 1/2 + 1/2√2[, Protocol 2 is c-complete, for
c ≤ (N − 1)(2EC + ′EC) +
(
1− µ
(
1− exp [− 2(pexp − δ)2]))n, (A.18)
where pexp > δ, δ is a threshold.
Proof. Protocol 2 can abort at two moments: it can abort during the error correction or during the parameter
estimation. For the error correction step, the protocol aborts if one of the Bobs aborts while trying to guess Alice’s
string, or if Alice aborts while guessing Bobs’ testing bits. We are assuming that the Bobs use the same error correction
protocol in order to send information about their outputs in the test rounds so that Alice can make her guess. Therefore
the overall probability of aborting during the error correction protocol is then bounded by 2(N − 1)EC for an honest
implementation. The probability of aborting during the parameter estimation part (conditioned on not aborting the
error correction step) is given by:
PPE(abort) = P (G(1...N−1) is correct)P
(∑
i
Ci < δ ·
∑
i
Ti
∣∣∣G(1...N−1) is correct)
+ P (∃k : G(k)is wrong)P
(∑
i
Ci < δ ·
∑
i
Ti
∣∣∣∃k : G(k)is wrong) (A.19)
where G(k) is Alice’s guess for Bobk’s testing rounds bits. It is said to be correct when the string G(k) = B′(k),I
for I := {i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1}. By bounding P (G(1...N−1) is correct) by 1, P (∃k : G(k)is wrong) by (N − 1)′EC, and
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P
(∑
i Ci < δ ·
∑
i Ti
∣∣∣∃k : G(k)is wrong) by 1, we get
PPE(abort) ≤
n∑
j=0
P
(∑
i
Ti = j
)
· P
(∑
i
Ci < δ · j
∣∣∣∑
i
Ti = j & ∀kK˜A = K˜B(k)
)
+ (N − 1)′EC. (A.20)
Let us consider an honest implementation such that pexp > δ, we can then rewrite (A.20) as,
PPE(abort)
≤
n∑
j=0
P
(∑
i
Ti = j
)
· P
(∑
i
Ci <
(
pexp − (pexp − δ)
) · j∣∣∣∑
i
Ti = j & G(1...N−1) is correct
)
+ (N − 1)′EC.
(A.21)
Note that the expectation value E(Ci) = pexp and because an honest implementation is i.i.d. we can use Hoeffding
inequalities to bound P
(∑
i Ci <
(
pexp − (pexp − δ)
) · j∣∣∣∑i Ti = j & G(1...N−1) is correct) < exp(−2(pexp − δ)2j).
Moreover the the i.i.d. random variables Ti follow a Bernoulli distribution with P (Ti = 1) = µ. Pluging all of this
into eq. (A.21) gives us,
PPE(abort) ≤
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(1− µ)n−jµj × exp(−2(pexp − δ)2j) + (N − 1)′EC (A.22)
=
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(1− µ)n−j(µ× exp(−2(pexp − δ)2))j + (N − 1)′EC (A.23)
=
(
1− µ
(
1− exp [− 2(pexp − δ)2]))n + (N − 1)′EC, (A.24)
where the last equality comes from the binomial theorem.
Soundness
In order to complete the security proof of Protocol 2, it remains to prove secrecy. Let Ωˆ′ be the event that Protocol 2
does not abort and that the error correction step is successful. The Leftover Hashing Lemma [21, Corollary 5.6.1]
states that the secrecy of the final key, after a privacy amplification protocol using a family of two-universal hashing
functions, depends on the amount of smooth min-entropy of the state before privacy amplification conditioned on the
event Ωˆ′.
Theorem 5 (Leftover Hashing Lemma [21]). Let F be a family of two-universal hashing functions from {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}l, such that F (An1 ) = KA for F ∈ F , then it holds that∥∥∥∥ρKAE|Ωˆ′ − 1A2l ⊗ ρE|Ωˆ′
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2+ 2−
1
2 (H

min(A
n
1 |E)ρ|Ωˆ′−l). (A.25)
According to Theorem 5, in order to prove the secrecy of Protocol 2 we need to lower bound the smooth min-
entropy Hmin(A
′n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 OO(1...N−1)E)ρ|Ωˆ′ . The proof goes in the following steps: In Lemma 4, we in-
troduce an error correction map and bound the entropy Hmin(A
′n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E) for the state after the action
of the error correction map, conditioned on the event that a particular violation is observed and the error cor-
rection protocol is successful. In Lemma 5, we relate the state generated by Protocol 2 conditioned on the event
that the error correction protocols were successful to the state artificially introduced in Lemma 4, and we estimate
Hmin(A
′n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 OO(1...N−1)E), taking into account the information leaked during the error correction pro-
tocol. Finally, in Lemma 6, we combine the previous results proving the soundness of Protocol 2.
To bound the smooth min-entropy we will use the EAT. Indeed, before the error correction part, Protocol 2 can be
described by a composition of EAT channels that we will callM1, . . . ,Mn (see Fig. 2).
In order to apply EAT we need to find a min-tradeoff function for the mapsMi defined by the Figure 2. I.e., we
need to find a function f such that
f(q) ≤ inf
σ∈Σi(q)
H(A′iC˜i|XiY(1...N−1),iTiR)σ, (A.26)
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B(1),i
·
·
·
B(N−1),i
Ri−1 Ri, C˜i
Xi, Ti
Y(1),i, Ti
Y(N−1),i, Ti
A′i, Xi
B′(1...N−1),i,
Y(1...N−1),i, Ti
Figure 2. Description of the mapMi. This map describes the round i of the first step of the Protocol 2. Ti is chosen at random
such that P (Ti = 1) = µ. Xi ∈ {0, 1} represents the “basis” in which Alice’s device, represented by the CPTP map Ai, measures
its input to get the output A′i ∈ {0, 1}. Xi = 0 when Ti = 0 and Xi ∈R {0, 1} otherwise. Y(k),i ∈ {0, 1, 2} represents the “basis”
in which Bobk’s device, represented by the CPTP map B(k),i, measures its input to get the output B′(k),i ∈ {0, 1}. If Ti = 0 we
have Y(k),i = 2, else we have Y(k),i ∈R {0, 1}. If Ti = 0 then C˜i = ⊥, else C˜i = wParity−CHSH(A′i, B′(1...N−1),i, Xi, Y(1...N−1),i).
for
Σi(q) := {σC˜iA′iB′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTiRiR = (Mi ⊗ 1R)(σRi−1R) : σRi−1R ∈ S(HRi−1R) & σC˜i = q},
where Σi(q) is the set of states that can be generated by the action of the channelMi⊗1R on an arbitrary state and
such that the classical register C˜i has distribution q.
Lemma 3. The real function defined as,
fˆ(x) :=
(
1− µ
2
)(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4x/µ− 2)2 − 1
))
(A.27)
is a min-tradeoff function for the EAT channels Mi defined by the Figure 2. Here µ is the testing probability of the
Protocol 2, and h(x) is the binary entropy: h(x) = −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x).
We define the affine function f( · , popt) over the probability distribution P({1, 0,⊥}) as, ∀ q =
(
q(1), q(0), q(⊥))t ∈
P({1, 0,⊥}),
f(q, popt) := fˆ
′(popt)q(1) + fˆ(popt)− fˆ ′(popt)popt, (A.28)
where popt ∈]µ3/4, µ(1/2 + 1/2
√
2)[.
In order to make the argument more rigorous and general, here f(·, popt) is a function that takes as input the vector
of frequencies q =
(
q(1), q(0), q(⊥))t.
Proof. Let us take a state σC˜iA′iB′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTiRiR ∈ Σi(q). Then we define the state
σ′
C˜iA′′i B
′′
(1),i
B′
(2...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTiFiRiR
(A.29)
to be the state we obtain from σC˜iA′iB′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTiRiR by replacing A
′
i by A′′i := A′i ⊕ Fi and B′(1),i by
B′′(1),i := B
′
(1),i ⊕ Fi where Fi is a bit that is chosen uniformly at random. None of the other registers are changed, in
particular, note that we still have that σ′
C˜i
= q, where the value of C˜i can be determined by the registers A′′i , B′′(1),i,
and B′(2...N−1),i. Moreover, since Fi is completely independent of the other variables and given the definition of A
′′
i ,
it is easy to check that,
H(A′iC˜i|XiY(1...N−1),iTiR)σ = H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR)σ′ . (A.30)
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This entropy can be lower bounded as follows:
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR)σ′ ≥ H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯)σ′ , (A.31)
where b¯ denotes the register containing the parity of B′(2...N−1),i. The right-hand side of the above inequality can be
expended as,
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯)σ′ = pb¯=0H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 0)σ′ (A.32)
+ pb¯=1H(A
′′
i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 1)σ′
We will now detail the derivation of a lower bound for H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 0). The lower bound on
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 1) follows the exacte same steps.
Using the chain rule,
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 0)σ′ ≥ H(A′′i |FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 0)σ′ , (A.33)
and since P (Xi = 0) = 1− µ2 ,
H(A′′i |FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 0)σ′ ≥
(
1− µ
2
)
·H(A′′i |FiY(1...N−1),iTiR,Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ . (A.34)
Given that for Xi = 0 Alice’s measurement is independent of Y(1...N−1),i and Ti we have
H(A′′i |FiY(1...N−1),iTiR,Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ = H(A′′i |FiR,Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ . (A.35)
Using the definition of the conditional Von Neumann entropy we can write:
H(A′′i |FiR,Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ = H(A′′i FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ −H(FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ (A.36)
= H(A′′i |Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ +H(FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ −H(FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−χ(A′′i :FiR|X=0,b¯=0)σ′
(A.37)
= 1− χ(A′′i : FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0)σ′ (A.38)
where χ(A′′i : FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0) is the Holevo quantity, and the last equality comes from the definition of A′′i being
a uniform variable (for any value of Xi and b¯).
In the following we will use pw for P
Parity−CHSH
win . From the definition of the Parity-CHSH inequality (see Def. 8), one
can noticed that conditioned on b¯ = 0, the Parity-CHSH game reduces the the usual CHSH game, and conditioned
on b¯ = 1 it reduces to a game that is equivalent to CHSH up to flipping input y. Therefore we can write pw =
pb¯=0pw|b¯=0 + pb¯=1pw|b¯=1, where pw|b¯=0 can be viwed as the winning probability of a CHSH game, and pw|b¯=1 as the
winning probability of the CHSH game with flipped input y. Moreover, for any state leading to a CHSH violation of
PCHSHwin = pw|b¯=0 ∈ [3/4, 1/2 + 1/2
√
2], Ref. [6, Section 2.3] gives a tight upper bound on χ(Ai : FiR|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0):
χ(A′′i : RFi|Xi = 0, b¯ = 0) ≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw|b¯=0 − 2)2 − 1
)
, (A.39)
where h(x) = −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x). This leads to,
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 0)σ′ ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw|b¯=0 − 2)2 − 1
)
. (A.40)
Similarily we can bound,
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯ = 1)σ′ ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw|b¯=1 − 2)2 − 1
)
. (A.41)
Using these two above inequalities in eq. (A.32) we get,
H(A′′i C˜i|FiXiY(1...N−1),iTiR, b¯)σ′ ≥ pb¯=0
(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw|b¯=0 − 2)2 − 1
))
(A.42)
+ pb¯=1
(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw|b¯=1 − 2)2 − 1
))
≥
(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4(pb¯=0pw|b¯=0 + pb¯=1pw|b¯=1)− 2)2 − 1
))
(A.43)
=
(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
(4pw − 2)2 − 1
))
, (A.44)
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where the last inequality holds by convexity.
Note that pw can be expressed in terms of the probability distribution q = (q(1), q(0), q(⊥))t (where t is the
transpose) as pw =
q(1)
1−q(⊥) . And because in our case the definition of the maps Mi implies 1 − q(1) = µ we have
pw =
q(1)
µ . Therefore the function
f¯(q) = fˆ(q(1)) =
(
1− µ
2
)
·
(
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√(
4 · q(1)/µ− 2)2 − 1)) , (A.45)
is a min-tradeoff function, and fˆ is a differentiable convex increasing function of one variable. To find an affine
min-tradeoff function f we take a tangent to fˆ for some value popt(n, δ) ∈
]
µ · 3/4, µ · (1/2 + 1/2√2)[ to be chosen,
where µ and δ are defined in the Protocol 2, which gives us,
f(q, popt) := fˆ
′(popt)q(1) + fˆ(popt)− fˆ ′(popt)popt. (A.46)
In the following Lemma we show that the state ρ˜ created by applying a sequence of n CPTP maps of the form
described by Fig. 2 on some initial state, (when conditioned on the event of having (statistically) high enough Bell
violation), possesses a linear amount of entropy.
Lemma 4. Let MEC be the CPTP map A′n1B′(1...N−1)n1 7→ A′
n
1B
′
(1...N−1)
n
1
KB(1...N−1)G(1...N−1) that models the
error correction protocols, applied during Step 3 of Protocol 2, which produce the raw keys KB(1...N−1) and the guess
G(1...N−1). For i ∈ [n] let Mi be the CPTP map from Ri−1 to A′iB′(1...N−1)iC˜iXiY(1...N−1),iTiRi defined in the
Fig. 2. Let Ω be the event {
∑
j C˜j ≥ δ ·
∑
j Tj for δ ∈
]
3/4, 1/2 + 1/2
√
2
[
and all the error correction protocols were
successful, meaning that ∀k, A′n1 = KB(k) and Alice guess G(1...N−1) is correct}. We define the state,
ρ˜A′n1 C˜n1 B′(1...N−1)n1X
n
1 Y(1...N−1)
n
1
Tn1 E
:= (trRn ◦Mn ◦ . . . ◦M1 ⊗ 1E)(ρR0E), (A.47)
where R0 = An1B(1...N−1)
n
1
, and ρR0E is the state shared between Alice, the Bobs, and Eve (produced by Alice’s source)
across the n rounds of the Protocol 2 before they apply any measurement. Then we have for any  ∈]0, 1[,
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
MEC(ρ˜)|Ω ≥
(
f(qˆ, popt)− µ
) · n− v˜√n+ 3 log(1−√1− (/4)2), (A.48)
where v˜ = 2
(
log(13) + (fˆ ′(popt) + 1)
)√
1− 2 log( · pΩ) + 2 log(7)
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1− (/4)2)), and qˆ = (δµ, µ −
δµ, 1− µ)t ∈ P({1, 0,⊥}).
Proof. Note that ρ˜|Ω := trKB(1...N−1)G(1...N−1)
(MEC(ρ˜)|Ω), therefore
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
MEC(ρ˜)|Ω = H

min
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
.
The mapsM1, . . . ,Mn are EAT channels with the following Markov conditions,
∀i ∈ [n], A′i−11 C˜i−11 ↔ Xi−11 Y(1...N−1)i−11 T i−11 E ↔ Xi1Y(1...N−1)i1T i1. (A.49)
Indeed for any round i ∈ [n] the variables XiY(1...N−1),iTi are chosen independently
of any other round j 6= i. We have proven that the function f( · , popt) is a min-
tradeoff function for the maps M1, . . . ,Mn. We can therefore use the EAT to bound
Hmin
(
A′n1 C˜
n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
:
Hmin
(
A′n1 C˜
n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
≥ nf(qˆ, popt)− c
√
n, (A.50)
where qˆ = (µδ, µ−µδ, 1−µ), c = 2( log(13)+dfˆ ′(popt)e)√1− 2 log( · pΩ), and pΩ is the probability of the event Ω. This
is true because f(q, , popt) is an increasing function of q(1), so for any event that implies
∑
j C˜j ≥ δ ·
∑
j Tj we have that
f(freq(C˜n1 ), popt) ≥ f(qˆ, popt), in particular Ω⇒ f(freq(C˜n1 ), popt) ≥ f(qˆ, popt). Note that because ∀x ∈ R, dxe ≤ x+1
we can upper bound dfˆ ′(popt)e by fˆ ′(popt) + 1 and then take c = 2
(
log(13) + (fˆ ′(popt) + 1)
)√
1− 2 log( · pΩ).
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Using [26, eq. (6.57)] we can relate Hmin
(
A′n1 C˜
n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
to
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
:
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
≥H 4min
(
A′n1 C˜
n
1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
−H 4max
(
C˜n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
+ 3 log(1−
√
1− (/4)2).
(A.51)
We now need to upper bound H

4
max
(
C˜n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
. First we note that,
H

4
max
(
C˜n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
≤ H 4max
(
C˜n1 |Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
.
To upper bound H

4
max
(
C˜n1 |Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
we will use [28, Lemma 28]. Indeed H

4
max
(
C˜n1 |Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
can be bounded exactly
in the same as in [28, Lemma 28], and leads to:
H/4max(C˜
n
1 |Tn1 E)ρ˜|Ω ≤ µn+ n(α− 1) log2(7) +
α
α− 1 log
(
1
pΩ
)
− log(1−
√
1− (/4)2)
α− 1 (A.52)
≤ µn+ n(α− 1) log2(7)− log(p
2
Ω(1−
√
1− (/4)2))
α− 1 , (A.53)
for α ∈]1, 2].
Taking α = 1 +
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1−(/4)2))
n log2(7)
gives us,
H/4max(C˜
n
1 |Tn1 E)ρ˜|Ω ≤ µn+ 2
√
n log(7)
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1− (/4)2)). (A.54)
Putting eq. (A.50),(A.51) and (A.54) together gives us,
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
≥ (f(qˆ, popt)− µ) · n− v˜√n+ 3 log(1−√1− (/4)2), (A.55)
where v˜ = 2
(
log(13) + (fˆ ′(popt) + 1)
)√
1− 2 log( · pΩ) + 2 log(7)
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1− (/4)2)).
Since Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
MEC(ρ˜)|Ω = H

min
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ˜|Ω
, we have,
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
MEC(ρ˜)|Ω ≥
(
f(qˆ, popt)− µ
) · n− v˜√n+ 3 log(1−√1− (/4)2). (A.56)
This bound holds for any popt ∈]µ3/4, µ(1/2 + 1/2
√
2)[.
In the following Lemma we link the result of the previous Lemma to the real state ρ generated by the protocol 2.
Indeed, in the real state, the “Bell violation” is not estimated directly, but via the error corrections that might fail
with some small probability. We show that the real state of the protocol, when conditioned on the event that Protocol
2 does not abort and the error corrections were successful, possesses a linear amount on entropy.
Lemma 5. Let us call Ωˆ the event of not aborting the Protocol 2 and Ωˆ′ the event Ωˆ and all the error correction pro-
tocols were successful, meaning that ∀k ∈ [N − 1], KB(k) = A′n1 and Alice’s guess G(1...N−1) is correct. Then, for any
EA, 
′
EC,  ∈]0, 1[, Protocol 2 either aborts with a probability 1−P (Ωˆ) ≥ 1−
(
1−2(N−1)′EC
)
EA (⇔ P (Ωˆ′) ≤ EA) or
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 OAO(1...N−1)E
)
ρ|Ωˆ′
≥
max
3/4≤ poptµ ≤1/2+1/2
√
2
n
((
f(qˆ, popt)− µ
)− 2( log(13) + (fˆ ′(popt) + 1))√1− 2 log( · EA)√
n
)
−√n
(
2 log(7)
√
− log(2EA(1−
√
1− (/4)2))
)
+ 3 log(1−
√
1− (/4)2)− leakEC(OA)
−
N−1∑
k=1
leakEC(O(k)),
(A.57)
where qˆ = (µδ, µ− µδ, 1− µ)t.
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Proof. Using the chain rule [26, Lemma 6.8] we get:
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 OAO(1...N−1)E
)
ρ|Ωˆ′
≥ Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ|Ωˆ′
− leakEC(OA)−
N−1∑
k=1
leakEC(O(k)), (A.58)
where leakEC(OA) is the leakage due to the error correction protocol (when the Bobs try to guess Alice’s bits) and
leakEC(O(k)) is the leakage due to error correction (when Alice tries to guess Bobk’s test rounds bits). These leakages
will be estimated in Section 3.
We now need to bound Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ|Ωˆ′
. Note that the reduced state on A′n1Xn1 Y(1...N−1)
n
1
Tn1 E of
the global state at the end of the Protocol 2 conditioned on the event Ωˆ′ of not aborting and all the error correction
protocol were successful, is equal to the stateMEC(ρ˜A′n1Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1 Tn1 E)|Ω, therefore using Lemma 4 we get:
Hmin
(
A′n1 |Xn1 Y(1...N−1)n1Tn1 E
)
ρ|Ωˆ′
≥ (f(qˆ, popt)− µ) · n− v˜√n+ 3 log(1−√1− (/4)2), (A.59)
where v˜ = 2
(
log(13) + (fˆ ′(popt) + 1)
)√
1− 2 log( · pΩˆ′) + 2 log(7)
√
− log(p2
Ωˆ′
(1−√1− (/4)2)).
The following Lemma concludes on the soundness of Protocol 2. To do so we need to relate the event Ωˆ that
the protocol 2 does not abort, with the event Ωˆ′ that protocol 2 does not abort and that the error corrections are
successful.
Lemma 6. For any implementation of the Protocol 2, either the protocol aborts with a probability greater than 1−EA
or it is ((N − 1)EC + PA + )-correct-and-secret while producing keys of length l defined in eq. (A.17).
Proof. Let Ωˆ be the event of not aborting in the protocol 2, and Ωˆ′ the event Ωˆ and all the error correction protocols
were successful. According to Lemma 5 we are into one of the two following cases:
• The protocol aborts with a probability 1−P (Ωˆ) ≥ 1− (1−2(N −1)′EC)EA. This is equivalent to P (Ωˆ′) ≤ EA
and implies that 1− P (Ωˆ) ≥ 1− EA.
• The aborting probability is 1− P (Ωˆ) ≤ 1− EA (which implies that P (Ωˆ′) ≥ EA) and the smooth min-entropy
of the final state conditioned on Ωˆ′ is bounded as in eq. (A.59). Conditioned on Ωˆ there is two cases:
– The error correction step failed. This happens with probability at most 2(N − 1)′EC.
– The error correction were successful and then all the keys agree. We have then the event Ωˆ′. Therefore
according to Lemma 5 the entropy is high enough to produce keys of length l such that:∥∥∥∥ρKAE|Ωˆ − 1A2l ⊗ ρE|Ωˆ
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ PA + 2, (A.60)
where PA is the privacy amplification error probability and  is the smoothing parameter.
By combining the two above cases we have that the Protocol 2 is (PA + 2(N − 1)′EC + 2)-correct-and-secret.
3. Asymptotic key rate analysis
In this section we evaluate the asymptotic key rate of the DICKA Protocol 2 and compare it to the case where the
parties perform N − 1 DIQKD protocols in order to establish a common key. In implementations where the efficiency
of generation of GHZ states is comparable to the efficiency of the generation of EPR pairs a common key using a
DICKA protocol can be, in principle, stablished in a much smaller number of rounds, however one need to analyse
how the QBER and the leakages in the error correction protocol affects the key generation.
To analyse the key rate we need to evaluate the length l of the final key produced by Protocol 2, Eq. (A.17), and
compute the rate r := l#rounds . To achieve this, we need to estimate the leakage due to the error correction step. We
use in our analysis an error correction protocol based on universal hashing [31, 32]. The size of the leakage is taken
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to be the amount of correction information needed if the implementation were honest, for some abort probability of
the error correction protocol of at most EC, and such that the guess (when not aborting) is correct with probability
at least 1− ′EC. For a given honest implementation, this leakage can be bounded as follows [32]:
leak(OA) ≤ max
k∈[N−1]
H ˜EC0 (A
n
1 |B′(k)n1Xn1 Y(1...N−1)Tn1 ) + log(′EC
−1
), (A.61)
leak(O(k)) ≤ H ˜EC0 (B′(k),I |A′n1Xn1 Y(1...N−1)Tn1 ) + log(′EC−1), (A.62)
for EC = ˜EC + ′EC, I := {i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1} and where H ˜EC0 is evaluated on the state produced by the honest
implementation. If it turns out that the implementation is not the expected one then the protocol will just abort
with a higher probability but the security is not affected.
We will consider here one particular honest implementation to evaluate the leakage. Then we will compare it
to what we would get using N − 1 device independent quantum key distribution ((N − 1)×DIQKD) protocols to
distribute the key to the N parties. For the key rate of the latter we will use the recent and most general analysis
given in [27]. Of course the following calculations can be adapted to other implementations.
Lemma 7 (Asymptotic key rate). There exist an implementation of Protocol 2 in which the achieved asymptotic key
rate is given by
rN−CKA,∞ = 1− h
12 + 12
√√√√√16
√1− 2QN
2
√
2
+
(1− 2Q)
(
1−√1− 2QN−2
)
8
√
2
2 − 1
− h(Q), (A.63)
where Q is the QBER between Alice and each of the Bobs.
Proof. In the following analysis we chose an i.i.d. honest implementation scenario where we assume that the channel
between Alice and each of the Bobs is a depolarizing channel:
D(ρ) = (1− pdep)ρ+ pdep1
2
, (A.64)
for pdep ∈]0, 1[. We will also apply this channel to model the noise on Alice’s side. The state that is produced by
Alice’s source is supposed to be an N -GHZ state denoted GHZN := |GHZN 〉〈GHZN |, where |GHZN 〉 := |0〉
⊗N+|1〉⊗N√
2
.
Therefore the state shared between Alice and the Bobs in one round is ρAB(1...N−1) := D⊗N (GHZN ). The QBER
between Alice and each of the Bobs can then be expressed as Q = 2pdep−p
2
dep
2 (⇔ pdep = 1−
√
1− 2Q) and the expected
winning probability of the Parity-CHSH game is given by:
pexp =
[
1
2
+
(1− pdep)N
2
√
2
+
(1− pdep)2(1− (1− pdep)N−2)
8
√
2
]
.
We can bound H0 by Hmax [34, Lemma 18] as,
H ˜EC0 (A
n
1 |B′(k)n1Xn1 Y(1...N−1)Tn1 ) ≤ H ˜EC/2max (An1 |B′(k)
n
1
Xn1 Y(1...N−1)T
n
1 ) + log(8/˜
2
EC + 2/(2− ˜EC)). (A.65)
Using the non-asymptotic version of the Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem [35, Theorem 9] we get:
H ˜EC/2max (A
n
1 |B′(k)n1Xn1 Y(1...N−1)Tn1 ) ≤ nH(A′i|B′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTi) +
√
n∆(˜EC), (A.66)
where ∆(˜EC) := 4 log
(
2
√
2
Hmax(A′i|B′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTi) + 1
)
· √2 log(8/˜2EC). We can now upper bound the
entropy for honest implementation of Protocol 2 as,
H(A′i|B′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTi) = (1− µ) ·H(A′i|B′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),i, Ti = 0) (A.67)
+ µ ·H(A′i|B′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),i, Ti = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ (1− µ) · h(Q) + µ, (A.68)
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Figure 3. Asymptotic key rate for N -device independent CKA (DICKA, dashed lines), and for the distribution of a secret
key between N parties through N − 1 device independent quantum key distribution ((N − 1)×DIQKD) protocols (solid lines),
when each qubit experiences independent bit errors measured at a bit error rate (QBER) Q. From top to bottom, the lines
correspond to N = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. We observe that for low noise it is advantageous to use our device independent N -CKA
protocol instead of using N − 1 DIQKD protocols [27]. In general, the comparison between the two methods depends on the
cost and noisiness of producing GHZ states over pairwise EPR pairs.
and Hmax(A′i|B′(1...N−1),iXiY(1...N−1),iTi) ≤ 1. This gives us an upper bound on leak(OA):
leak(OA)
≤ n · ((1− µ) · h(Q) + µ)+√n · 4 log (2√2 + 1) ·√2 log(8/˜2EC) + log(8/˜2EC + 2/(2− ˜EC)). (A.69)
Using the same reasoning, we get:
leak(O(k)) ≤ n · µ+
√
n · 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)
·
√
2 log(8/˜2EC) + log(8/˜
2
EC + 2/(2− ˜EC)). (A.70)
Putting this into equation (A.17) we get,
l =
(
f(qˆ, popt)− (1− µ)h(Q)− (N + 1)µ
) · n− vˆ√n+ 3 log(1−√1− (/4)2)− log(−1PA)
−N · log(8/˜2EC + 2/(2− ˜EC)), (A.71)
where vˆ = v˜ +N · 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)
·√2 log(8/˜2EC), and v˜ is defined in Theorem 4.
Note that in the asymptotic regime n → ∞ we can take the threshold δ to be δ = pexp, and the optimal popt
will be popt = µδ = µpexp. Also for the asymptotic analysis we chose µ = n−1/10. Therefore the asymptotic rate
r∞ := limn→∞ l#rounds becomes,
rN−CKA,∞ = fˆ(µpexp)− h(Q)
= 1− h
12 + 12
√√√√√16
√1− 2QN
2
√
2
+
(1− 2Q)
(
1−√1− 2QN−2
)
8
√
2
2 − 1
− h(Q). (A.72)
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We then compare it to the asymptotic rate we would get if in order to distribute a key to N parties, Alice were
to use a DIQKD protocol for each of the Bobs. To get the asymptotic rate for the (N − 1) DIQKD protocols, we
use the analysis given in [27]. In their DIQKD protocol they consider an honest implementation where the state is a
depolarized EPR pair (1− ν)ΦAB + ν 12 . If we say that, for each Bob, Alice sends the state via the same depolarizing
channel she uses in the previous analysis (and that she has the same noise on her qubits), we can link the parameter
ν with the depolarizing parameter pdep of the channel and to the QBER Q: ν = 2p− p2 = 2Q. Therefore we get:
r(N−1)×QKD,∞ =
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2 · (1− 2Q)2 − 1
)
− h(Q)
N − 1 . (A.73)
Note that the factor 1/(N − 1) comes from the fact that the total number of rounds while running N − 1 DIQKD
protocols is (N − 1)n, where n is the number of rounds for one DIQKD protocol.
The comparison of the key rates of DICKA, Eq. (A.72), and (N − 1)×DIQKD, Eq. (A.73), for different values of
N , are plotted in Fig. 3. The results show that for low noise it is advantageous to use the DICKA protocol. In this
comparison we assume that the cost of generation of a GHZ state is the same as the cost to generate one EPR pair.
However, in implementations where the GHZ state is created out of EPR pairs that will not be the case. Therefore
the cost of creation of these states must be taken into account in the analysis of the particular implementations.
Note, also, that in this Section we have modelled the implementation for depolarising channels, however the security
analysis is general and can be adapted for any particular implementation.
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